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A B S T R A C T   
An investment project may be capital constrained when its risk exceeds the risk limit of pro-
spective investors. We propose a new equity-contract in which the project’s performance-sharing 
across investors respects the individual investor’s risk limit while staying as close as possible to 
his/her percentage contribution in equity of the project. The proposed arrangement of 
performance-sharing thus ensures that the investors with constrained risk limits take less share of 
performance during high-risk episodes, while the less constrained investors are more exposed. 
The former pay a premium to the latter to compensate for the partial risk transfer. The proposed 
performance-sharing agreement is expected to be especially useful for risk-constrained equity 
investors who are restricted in their use of risk-free investments to reduce investment risk.   
1. Introduction 
Investors set their investment objectives under constraints on the risk of their periodic returns. Often, this implies setting a risk limit 
that their periodic returns will not fall below a threshold under a certain probability level (Das et al., 2010). These constrained in-
vestors may be reluctant to invest in a project with positive net present values but substantial risks in future values. A conventional 
solution for the problem is to offset the excess of risk with risk-free assets. This solution is not permissible for Islamic investors 
(Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2018). It may not be feasible for conventional investors when they face full investment constraint in risky assets 
or not desirable in periods of negative interest rates on risk free investment(Corneille et al., 2020). 
We propose to account for the risk limits of such investors in the definition of a performance-sharing rule that can deviate from the 
traditional capital allocation-based one. Through a proposed agreement between investors, we transform single project returns into 
distinct investor returns constrained by their risk limits. The transformation involves two steps. First, at the start of each period, the 
investors agree on a performance share that is the closest to their capital contribution and constrained by their risk limits. Second, at 
the end of the period, the performance is distributed according to the ex ante agreed performance shares unless the losses are so 
extreme that one party needs to contribute additional capital. In that case, there is an ex post truncation, which we detail in the paper. 
We refer to this proposed sharing rule as performance risk-limits matching (PRISMA). 
This system of performance-sharing is especially beneficial for the most risk-constrained investor. We recommend a compensation 
to the counterparty taking more risk. This happens through the payment of a premium. To balance the risk-return rearrangement 
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between the investors, we calibrate premium values at break-even level in their expected risk-adjusted returns. This arrangement may 
allow us to fix the premium without violating no-arbitrage and gharar (Shari’a) restrictions. In fact, the ex ante agreement to transfer 
future risk is also possible under Shari’a rules if we adopt takaful al ta’awuni (El-Gamal, 2006) conditions.1 
We organize the remaining parts of the paper in three sections. In the next section we introduce the proposed PRISMA model with 
required variable and optimization settings. In Section 3, we apply the model as an agreement between two risk limit types with single 
investor in each category and present our analysis of the results. In the last section, we conclude with final remarks. 
2. Criteria for performance-sharing optimization 
We begin the section with general investment settings and define its transformation into PRISMA performance-sharing rule. After 
these general settings, we define the ex ante optimization for performance-sharing ratios under the proposed system along with ex post 
truncation and premium calibration. 
2.1. General settings 
Assume at time t, N investing agents start an investment project, with each agent i ∈ N contributing Vi,t amount, such that the 
project initial value is Vt =
∑N
i=1Vi,t and the investment contribution ratio of agent i is wi,t =
Vi,t
Vt . In conventional finance, the future 







= rt+1. (1) 
The performance-sharing mechanism in Eq. (1) shares the project performance equally and does not recognize the fact that the 
investors may be risk-constrained. We propose an alternate mechanism of performance-sharing that accounts the risk limits of the 
investors. 
2.2. Proposed performance-sharing rule 
We introduce a performance risk-limit matched (PRISMA) performance-sharing rule that requires an agreement between investors 
to share future performance of a risky project in a ratio that is based on ex ante risk and constrained by their risk limits. We propose that 
at each point in time t and for an ex ante risk ℛt+1|t of the project, each agent i with risk limit λi agree with the other agents to share the 
future performance of the project at time t + 1 in a ratio ei,t that ensures 
ei,tℛt+1|t ≤ λiwi,t, (2)  
where ℛt+1|t is the predicted risk for the project return over the horizon from t to t + 1, conditional on the information available at time 
t. The performance-sharing constraint in Eq. (2) guarantees that during high-risk conditions, no risk-constrained investor is allocated 
share of expected risk ei,tℛt+1|t more than their risk acceptance threshold defined in terms of their invested capital λiwi, t. The ex ante 











Without loss of generality, we group investors into two distinct risk limit categories, particularly the low risk limit (LRL) and the 
high risk limit (HRL) investors. Suppose that the risk limits can be defined as λl and λh for LRL and HRL investors, respectively, such that 
λl ≤ ℛt+1|t ≤ λh. 
The performance-sharing under the proposed performance-sharing mechanism in Eqs. (2) and (3) is especially beneficial for the 
LRL investors, as it protects them during high-risk conditions from risk allocation over and above their risk thresholds. To compensate 
the HRL investors for taking more risk, we recommend charging a periodic premium π from the LRL investors: 
Vπi,t = Vi,t − π1λi=λl Vi,t + π1λi=λh Vi,t. (4)  










rt+1, (5)  
where 
1 To define premium in Shari’a terms, we consider premium as tabarru/hibah mashrutah bi’iwad, whose value may be fixed and is legally 
enforceable to demand contractual indemnity under the agreement (Archer et al., 2011). The application of tabarru and the premium is the same, in 
terms of calculations 
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The performance-sharing ratios ei,t, under PRISMA performance-sharing rule, are proposed to be as close as possible to the 
premium-adjusted investor contribution wπi,t to capital of the project and constrained by investor risk-acceptance threshold λi. 
2.3. PRISMA-PSR ex ante optimality 
For an ex ante project risk ℛt+1|t at time t, and for the investor risk limit λi and the premium-adjusted capital contribution wπi,t , the 






























where 𝒞 is the feasible set. The solution to the optimization problem in Eq. (7) minimizes the divergence of new performance-sharing 
ratios ei,t from premium-adjusted capital invested ratio wπi,t. The system also reduces the chances of loss allocation to the investors, 
higher than their risk limit. 
It is important to understand that the optimal solution for proposed performance-sharing ei,t in Eq. (7) is based on ex ante risk 
measure and is applied on ex post project returns in Eq. (5). In extreme risk conditions, this performance-sharing may lead to an ex post 
share of losses that exceed the invested capital of HRL investors. To avoid this undesirable feature, we add an ex post adjustment 
ensuring that no investor is allocated more losses than their invested capital, while remaining as close as possible to the ex ante 
solution. 
2.4. PRISMA-PSR ex post adjustment 
For period t, ex ante performance-sharing ratios ei,t, and the ex post losses rt, the adjusted performance-sharing ratios ρi,t are defined 



























rt ≥ − 1.
(8)  
where 𝒟 is the feasible set. The model reallocates actual losses such that all losses are accounted for and investors are allocated losses 
not more than their capital. 
2.5. Premium calibration 
Under the performance-sharing agreement, the LRL investors reduce their exposure to risk at the detriment of the HRL investors. 
The HRL investor thus requires a premium to compensate for the higher risk exposure, while the LRL investor is willing to pay for this. 
A challenging question is to determine the equilibrium premium. In this paper, we take a practical approach and set the premium such 
that the expected risk-adjusted returns are equal. The risk-adjusted returns equal the average return divided by their volatility, as 
defined in Boudt et al. (2019). Their expected counterpart is computed by resampling techniques. We use a grid search to set the 
premium to the smallest value satisfying all risk limit constraints while achieving the break-even condition in terms of expected 
risk-adjusted returns. 
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1. GJR Model Specifications:
(a) Let t be daily time intervals, then the location scale for daily log returns is:
Rt = µt + σtεt,
where Rt is the daily log-return with conditional mean µt and standard deviation σt, and εt the standardized error term with
zero mean and unit volatility;
(b) The variance equation under the GJR-GARCH model is:
σ2t+1 = ω + (α + γ1Rt<µt )(Rt − µt)2 + βσ2t ,
where the coefficients ω, α, and β are all positive;
(c) Parameter Estimation: We estimate daily parameters on a rolling basis from inception using Gaussian quasi-maximum
likelihood.
2. Nonparametric Monthly VaR:
(a) Let m represent the number of days in the risk evaluation period;
(b) Let µm and σm be predicted mean and volatility for the m days returns;
(c) Let rm be the centered returns in the sample around µm then;
rm = rm − µm.
(d) Let zm be m days standardized return and calculated as
zm = rm/σm.
(e) Let α = 5% and zm(α) be the α historical quantile of zm, then we set:
VaRαm = µm + zm(α)σm.
Algorithm 1. Monthly (m days) semiparametric VaR.  
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3. Illustration for PRISMA performance-sharing rule 
In this section, we illustrate PRISMA performance-sharing rule for out-of-sample analysis on aggregate US stock returns over the 
period from January 1980 to October 2019.2 
3.1. Calibration 
As a risk measure, we use the value at risk (VaR) because it is considered to be the industry standard for downside risk. We assume 
the PRISMA-rule to be set each month (22 working days) and the monthly VaR be calculated through semiparametric quantile method 
at the 5% probability level. The procedure to calculate the monthly VaR is described in Algorithm 1, which uses a burn-in sample of 
2000 days. The out-of-sample evaluation period is thus from January 1988 to October 2019. 
We assume two investor types with low and high risk limits, with single risk limit in each category, such that the performance of the 
project under PRISMA performance-sharing rule is shared between them. This agreement may include single or multiple investors on 
each side of the risk limit type. In case of more than one investor in any investor type, the investor in each category will share the 
eventual performance in proportional capital contribution of such category. We set three different risk limit scenarios: RLS1 (λl = 0.03,
λh = 1), RLS2 (λl = 0.09, λh = 1), and RLS3 (λl = 0.15,λh = 1). 
We use grid search method to find minimum value for premium adjustment that guarantees equal expected risk-adjusted returns for 
both investor types on post-PRISMA results. The calibrated premium at each risk limit scenario are 0.37% for RLS1, 0.1245% for RLS2, 
and 0.0395% for RLS3. 
3.2. Results for proposed performance-sharing rule 
The application of PRISMA performance-sharing rule transforms investor returns, performance share ρi,t and capital allocation 
weights wπi,t. The results in comparison to conventional sharing mechanism are reported in Table 1 and Fig. 1. 
The results in Table 1 show that PRISMA performance-sharing rule guarantees equal expected risk-adjusted returns for both LRL 
and HRL investors. The LRL investor has lower returns with lower volatility, and the HRL investor has higher returns with higher 
volatility. PRISMA performance-sharing rule also guarantees that the LRL investor’s risk sharing ratios (ρi,t) reduce with decreasing 
risk-limits. 
Fig. 1 shows the corresponding cumulative investment values. We see that for RLS1, where the LRL investor has a very low monthly 
risk-limit (0.03), there is the highest gap between their cumulative invested values. This is partly because of the higher premium 
charged from the LRL investor. The gap between cumulative investment values of the investors and the project is reducing as we 
increase the monthly risk-limit of the LRL investor. 
4. Conclusion 
A risky investment project may lose prospective investment from risk-constrained investors when its time-varying risks exceed their 
risk-limits. We introduce an alternate mechanism to make performance-sharing, flexible enough to adapt to the investor risk-limits. 
Our proposed model successfully allocates the project performance in accordance with the investor risk limits, even at extreme risk 
limits. The model allows for LRL investors, to limit their risks and keep their over-all returns competitive in comparison to the con-
ventional risk-free securities. 
Table 1 
Out-of-sample results for PRISMA contract applied to US stock returns.  
Scenarios Risk limits  Ann. ret. Ann. std. dev Ann. RAR  Av.(ρi,t) Av.(wπi,t)  
RLS1 λl = 0.03   0.068 0.085 0.794  0.201 0.269 
λh = 1   0.130 0.163 0.794  0.799 0.731 
RLS2 λl = 0.09   0.085 0.132 0.645  0.441 0.446 
λh = 1   0.096 0.149 0.645  0.559 0.554 
RLS3 λl = 0.15   0.088 0.138 0.637  0.480 0.481 
λh = 1   0.091 0.143 0.637  0.520 0.519 
Conventional   0.0883 0.1411 0.626  0.5 0.5 
Note: The table shows out-of-sample results for three risk-limit scenarios for both LRL and HRL investors. We show annualized returns, standard 
deviations, and risk-adjusted returns under PRISMA performance-sharing rule for each investor in each scenario against conventional project results 
in the last row. We also show the PRISMA-adjusted average weights of invested capital and the ex post performance-sharing ratios for each investor 
under each scenario. 
2 We take S&P 500 adjusted price index as a proxy for the project value evolution. While this index is not a representative for a typical investment 
project, we choose it for illustration as it is available for a long time span. 
K. Boudt and M.-A. Khokhar                                                                                                                                                                                       
Finance Research Letters 38 (2021) 101527
6
The project risk and the fair premium value may be difficult to estimate for risky projects. This creates model risk in the proposed 
performance sharing rearrangement. The model risk is higher, when there is high uncertainty about the project cashflows, when the 
total project duration is longer, or when the risk prediction horizon is longer. 
In this research paper, we have taken only two investors with very low and very high risk limit and created a one-to-one contractual 
mapping for premium-indemnity mechanism. In the future, we would like to propose a generalized mechanism where in each account 
we can take more than one risk-limit. 
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Fig. 1. Cumulative investment value under PRISMA performance-sharing rule Note: The grids from top to bottom show investor values under 
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